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PROVOCATION OF THE BATTERED WOMAN: NORMALIZATION
OF THE WOMAN'S ExPERIENCE THROUGH A SYNDROME

-Radhika Chitkara
INTRODUCTION
The law estimates human behaviour ro be a paragon of restraint and rationality.
The defence of 'provocation' in criminal law is presumably a singular exception
to that standard. Here, the aggressor is permitted to take the benefit of an excited
and undeliberated action in causing the death of another. In this way, the law seeks
to distinguish between the moral culpability of a person who kills in a calculated
and motivated manner and one who kills in a sudden response to an external
stimulus which causes a loss of self-control in the heat ofpassion. ' Accordingly,
,he defence of provocation is often regarded as 'a concession to human frailty."
Under common law, the test employed in the plea of provocation is, first, ro
determine whether there was grave and sudden provocation, and, second, ro
ascertain a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. The second leg of the test
has two components unto itself: to examine whether the defendant actually lost
self-control and whether a reasonable person would have also lost self-control
in the same situation.'
The case of R v. Ahluwalia revolutionized 'provocation' under common law by
exposing the gendered subtext of this defence.' The case involved a woman who
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A.J. Ashworth, Th, Doctrin<ofProvocation 35(2) CAMBRIDGE LAw JO URNAL 292 (I 976).
!d. ar 295; J.We. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAw 173 (19- edn. , 1966).
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DullY, [1949] 1 All ER 932.
[1992] All ER 889; rhis case closely followed R v. Thornton, [1992] 1 All ER 306, where
the same: defence was rejected for another battered woman; however, in R v. Thornton

(No.2), [1996] 2 ALL ER 1023, a rerrial was ordered on rhe basis of medical evidence of
the Banered Woman Syndrome. indicating increased recognition of the woman's situation

in abusive relationships.
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had been a victim of severe, system ised domestic abuse and sexual assault by
her husband. After years of such torture, she set fire to her husband pursuant
to a drunken brawl in which he threatened violence against her again. She
was initially convicted for murder. A retrial was later ordered, at which her
conviction was reduced to manslaughter. Evidence of the abuse was adduced,
and the court, for the first time, recognised the 'slow-burn' reactions of battered
women who suffer from the so-called Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS).
The court analysed how the provocation defence, by pri ritising spontaneous
reactions, eliminates the experiences of victims of domestic abuse who normally
react after some delay to cumulative violence, and that does not necessarily
imply an absence of loss of sel f-control.
Since Ahluwalia, BWS has been widely accepted in a num ber of common law
jurisdictions to include the experiences of women into the folds of the law. 5 In
India, Exception 1 to S.300, Indian Penal Code (IPC) justifies causing death
in response to 'grave and sudden provocation' . This provision continues to be
governed largely by KM N anavati v. State ofMaharashtra: which only slightly
relaxes the common law standard of spontaneity. Subsequent decisions have read
Exception 1 to s. 300 to also include 'sustained provocation', due to which the
loss of self-control may be triggered by a si ngular event.' It was only in 2013
that the Indian judiciary explicitly discussed and affirmatively recognised the
BWS, in the recent decision of M anjuLakra v. State ofAssam'
While acceptance of the BWS is laudable, I argue that the gender of the
provocation defence continues to be largely masculine, and that the recognition
of the BWS does not erode that undercurrent. Such recognition may, in fact,
lead to an abrasion of the agency of women in the law.
5

These jurisdictions include Australia. Canada. and United States of America, and United
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Kingdom.
AIR 1962 SC 605.
Suyambukani v. State ofTamil Nadu, 1989 L.W (C d.) 86; while ManjuLakra v. State of
Tamil Nadu, infra, rejected the approach of the Madras High Court in Suyambukani as
an exercise in legislation and no t interp retatio n, it nevertheless accepted the proposition
that 'sustained provocation' is incl uded within Exception 1
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20 13 (4) GLT 333
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5. ':100, IPC.
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This paper proceeds in four parts. The first part characterises domestic violence
and the Battered Woman Syndrome. The second part looks at the relationship
of both the genders with violence, to explain the difference between spontaneous
use of violence and slow-burn reactions. The third part seeks to expose the
gendered connotations of the provocation defence. This culminates in the last
part, which demonstrates how the agency of women is impacted by the separate
recognition of the BWS. This will be undertaken in light of the stereotypical
perception of the stereotypical woman in the law, against this image of the
'aggressor' or the 'criminal.' To undertake this analysis, the paper looks at both,
the common law as evolved in the United Kingdom and other commonwealth
jurisdictions and Indian law under the IPe.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Domestic violence is a ubiquirous phenomenon and can take various forms
- psychological, physical or sexual. It is the systemized infliction of violence
on the woman within the home as an expression of the power relationships
within a marital/domestic setup.' Regular beatings (often grievous), demeaning
comments, sexual abuse, etc., directed at the women characterize such violence.
It is perpetrated, often legitimized, due to the perception that the mind and body
of the woman is the site for the man to exercise control and dominance over.
Dr. Lenore Walker, in the 1980s, studied the psychology of battered women, and
propounded the BWS. She postulated a three-phase cycle of abuse, and also the
responses of the victims to it. She posits that the violence recycles itself as follows: 10
I. The tension-building phase, characterized by relatively minor abuse, often
verbal;

9

H. BARNEIT, SOURCEBOOK ON FEMI NIST JURISPRUDENCE 404 (1997); UNITED NATIONS
ORGANISATION, THE WORLD'S WOMEN: TRENDS AND STATISTICS

10

(1990).

LEA WALKER. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME8 (3'" ed .. 2009); MA Dutlon,
Undu-uanding Womms Responses to Domestic Violtnu: A Rukfinition of Batttred Woman

Syndrom, 21 HOFSTRA LAw REvIEW 1196 (1992-1993); AR Callahan. Will ,he "Rral"
Battered Woman PUase S'and Up' In S,arch ofa Realistic Legal Definition ofBattered Woman
Syndrom" 3 AMERICANUNIVERSITI J OURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAw 118 (1994); jA
Lifschicz, Baturtd Woman Syndrome and Prosecution of Domestic Abuse and Rape CasN 5
GEORGETOWN UNfVERSITI JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAw 150 (2004).
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2. The acute-battering phase. characterized by severe beatings and assaults;
3. The loving-contrition phase. where the husband feels remorse and assures
reform.
She theorised that this cyclical behaviour fosters a sense of 'learned helplessness'
in the victim - a belief that there is no escape from the abuse, eyen if in fact there
is. Progressively, she experiences fear, guilt and low self-esteem, which eventually
degenerates into severe passivity. She srops seeking help or counselling, and is
convinced that the only means of putting an end to the violence is by changing
herself. I I
Dr. Walker cites this passIvIty ro explain why the women contInue the
relationship instead of walking out. This is a conundrum that the law struggles
to address and has been the basis for the denial of defences to these women. I '
This act of submission is perceived as an active, though irrational, choice made
by the women to sustain the violence. This further affirms the conventional
characterization of the Woman as the emotional, irrational Other. In this
manner, the law is able ro hold these women responsible for their situations."
However, this question implicitly assumes that walking out will put an end
to the violence. This is most often not true." The violence tails the woman,
and abandonment may in faCt invite greater violence. in its construction as an
offence ro male pride and honour. Dr. Walker further argues that it is not the
real, but the perceived lack of choice by these women, that keeps them in such
abusive relationships.
The 'Learned Helplessness' hypothesis, despite finding judici acceptance, has
stirred numerous hornet's nests.Gondolf and Fisher criticise it for painting the

11
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LEA WALKER, idar 10; The Ahluwalia case, in fact, cites instances where Kiranjit Ahluwalia
swore to keep offlaughter. black coffee. green chillies, hair dye, and hel friends in anempts
to pacifY her husband.
R v. Lavallee, [1990]1 S.C.R. 852.

Id.; M . Shaffer, Thr Battmd WOman Syndromr Revisiud: Comr Complicating Thoughts
Fiv( Yrarr after R v. Lavallu47(1) THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAw JOURN AL 5 (1997).
M. BeCKER ET AL, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERJ O US LY; CAsES AND
MAT ERlALS 386 (2""edn., 2001 ).
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woman as intensely helpless. 15 Apart from being inaccurate, this theory has the
pitfall of stereoryping and exclusion. The benefit of 'slow-burn reactions' is
denied to those women who do not fit the mould of such passiviry. In response,
they expounded the Survivor Hypothesis, which characterizes the women as
'active survivors' instead of'helpless victims.'16They argue that battered women,
in fact, do persistently seek help and counselling in efforts to escape from their
situation. However, crippling realities {that the law is blind to} ensure that
they are unable to. The avenues of help that they explore - family, friends,
support agencies - implore the women to return ro the batterer and attempt
reconciliation , 17 due to an emphasis on the preservation of the family over the
securiry 'if the woman. Inevitably, with absence of economic independence
from husbands, walking out of the relationship leads to a daunting sttuggle
for survival.
Due to the location of the violence within the so-called private domain of
the 'home' and the 'family,' instances of such abuse often go unreported. This
may also be because of the excessive normalization of the occurrence. Marital
authoriry of the husband over his wife, while not formally a part of the law,
is still recognised socially. The rampancy of domestic violence ensures that it
is not viewed as something' out of the ordinary.' Consequently, few legal and
social forces come to the aid of the victims of such prolonged abusive behaviour.

In this manner, the responses of the law and sociery create the conditions for
an environment of domestic abuse to breed and prosper. Gondolf and Fisher
argue that it is the failure of these formal and informal avenues of help that
lead to the entrapment of 'battered women' inside their homes, and not their
helplessness. "

J5
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Jd at 388; AR Callahan, supra note J 0 at J 25.
Supra note 14 at 389; B. Rothenberg, The Success of the Battered Woman Syndrome: An
Analysis of H ow CulturalArgummts Sucmd 17(1 ) SOC IOLOGICAL FORUM 82 (2002).

J7

B. ROlhenberg, w,. Don) Have TIme for Social Change':' Cultural Compromise and the
Battered Woman Syndrome 17(5) G EN DER AND S OCIETY 775 (2003) .

J8

Id.
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RELATIONSHIP OF GENDERS WITH VIOLENCE
Despite the background of domestic abuse, the provocation defence has been
unavailable ro women because of the prioritisation of the rpontaneous use of
violence as proof of loss of self-control. Common law posits that any delay
in a violent response conclusively indicates premeditation." Thus, if there is a
time lag between the killing and the act of provocation, an investigation into
whether there was actually a loss of self-control at the time of killing is precluded.

I'

Comparatively, Indian law mitigates the requirement of'su den' provocation.
It looks more closely at the causal relationship between the loss of self-control
and the grave and sudden provocation. Therefore, the loss of self-control may be
temporally distant from the grave provocation, but must necessarily be caused
by it. 21 Indian law recognises, as in Rexv. Lesbini,22 that lapse of time between
the provocation and the violence may be sufficient for a reasonable man to cool
down." Therefore, Indian law insists upon a 'trigger' immediately preceding
the violence, which is otherwise related to a sustained provocative conduct."
This is borne out by the facts of ManjuLakra as well. This was the case of a
wife who faced severe domestic abuse on a daily basis by a heavily inebriated
husband. On one such occasion of battering, she snatched the husband's club
and beat him to death with it. The domestic violence was proof of sustai ned
and gtave provocative conduct by the husband. The Court further looked for
a 'trigger' ro satisfY the 'suddenness' of loss of self-control, ;md on facts, the
plea succeeded.25 ManjuLakra, therefore, clarified that while not all acts of
19

M. Baron , Gmder Issues in the Criminal Law in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY
CRIMINAL LAw 340 U. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds.), ,2011).

OF

20

21

/d. a l 34 1.
Consider Principle 4 in KM Nanavari y, State ofMaharashrra, Supra 6, which says mat the
fatal blow should be clearly traceable to the influence of passion arising out of
previous

me

provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise.
giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation;Jan Muhammad v. Emperor.

ILR 11929] Lah 861 ; Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828, which
imports KM Nanavari into S.498 -A, IPe to determine cause and effect between acts of
cruelty and the dowty death.
22

(1914) 3 KB 11 16.

23

Arun Raj v. Union ofIndia, Criminal Appeal No. 1 I 2312008(Supreme Court of India).

24

Supra noce?; supra noce 8.

25

Supra noce 8.
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provocation must precede the death, at least some should, thereby excluding
'slow-burn' reactions of battered women: "
The series of acts, which together constitute 'grave and sudden'
provocation, must be such acts of provocation, which never really
allowed the accused to calm down, and the act, immediately preceding
the killing, was the culmination of the previous provocative acts as
mentioned hereinbefore.

Such legal norms deny an acknowledgement of the differing relationships that
men and women have with violence. It neglects that spontaneity in violence is
necessarily a male response, to the exclusion of the female response, popularly
referred to as 'slow-burn.'
This is because violence constructs masculinity. Primordially, the man
assumed the role of the 'hunter and garherer,' while the woman was the
caretaker. Through the Middle Ages, participation in duels was rhe staple
form of dispute resolurion in the protection of men's honour. 27 Even in what
Spierenburg defines as 'passive' societies, a man's killing of another man in
adultery with his wife was justified." Numerous initiation ceremonies for
men in communities and tribes centre on the use of violence against another
man or animal. Even in contemporary times, the use of violence in defence of
personal, communal or national honour is perceived as a just recourse. Boys
are socialised into playing with violent toys and games, while girls are taught
the value of aestherics and beauty from a young age. In several ways, therefore,
violence becomes a predominantly male domain. So, while violence constructs
masculinity, femininity, in contradistinction, comes to be defined by passivity
and forbearance, since she is the careraker and the nurturer.
The outcome of this process is a naturalization of the use of violence by men
- a process which women do not undergo. Accordingly, men are socialized to
employ violence in the resolution of disputes in quoridian matters or in the
26
27

Supra note 8.
MEN AND VIOLENCE: GENDER, HONOR AND RITUALS IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 7

(P. Spietenburg (ed), 1998); RB Shoemaker, Th, Tamingofth, Dud Masculinity, Honour
and Ritual Viokn« in Lonfum, 1660-180045(3) THE HISTORICAL JOURNAL 525 (2002).
28

P. Spierenburg, rd. at 3.
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fulfilment of their role as the protectors. O ' Donovan moves this analysis further
by looking at contemporary crime records. She suggests that most homicide
cases involve male aggressors and male victims, which paints an evocative picture
of violence as a male activiry."
This is not to say that women do not employ violence at all. Taylor analyses
patterns in male and female behaviours vis-a-vis violence and proposes that
both live in entirely different 'subcultures of violence."· W h ile men resort to
violence in 'anger' and 'revenge,' women resort to it out of 'fear' and 'anxiety.'
Accordingly, to say that women are related to violence in the same way that men
are related to violence is a negation of crucial forces of socialization. At the same
time, it is necessary to ensure that while these distinct socialised experiences
are recognised, it does not degenerate into a problematic generalization and
homogenisation of attitudes.
There are reasons particular to the experiences of battered women as well which
provide an explanation to this delay in response without necessarily establishing
an absence of loss of self-control. This pertains to the power inequal ity that
exists between the aggressor and the victim . The Fact that almost all kill ings by
battered women were committed when the husband/partner was incapacitated
- he was either intoxicated or asleep - is as telling as it is startling." This is
because the woman reels from a fear of being physically overpowered in case
of aggression while the man is in full capacity. As has been argued elsewhere,
the provocation defence classically imagines a brawl amo g two physically
comparable men." It does not make room for the reaction of persons driven
by fear of someone physically stronger than themselves. Battered wo men are
all too aware of the consequences of such Failure - further ab use.

29

K. O ' Don ovan, Drftnm fo r Batttrrd Womm Who Kill, 18 JOlR NA L OP LAW AND
SOCIETY(1 991) at 219.

30

LJ Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Wom cn: Hrat ofPassion Mansllughter and Imperfect
Sr/fDifmcd3 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1681 (1986).

31

A. McColgan, In Drftnu ofBattm d Women who Kill 13 OXFORD JOU RNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES 508 (1 993); H . BARNETT, Supra 9 at 41 3.

32

L Leader- Elliot. Passion and imurr(ction in tht Law ofStxUal Provocation in SJ:l.X.ING TH E
SUBJECT OP LAw 15 1(N. Naffi ne and RJ Owens (eds), 1997).
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Does this indicate premeditation? Not necessarily. Any such conclusion will presume
that reason rakes as much time to resume its seat in the mind of the accused as it
does to be displaced. It is possible for the woman to continue to be consumed by
fear and anxiety long after the trigger has been shot, as they maintain they often
do. 33 Further, as Marcia Baron argues, men too selectively employ violence in the
same way. She analyses how a loss of self-convol in men towards their bosses or
friends does not result in violence, while towards their wives it does. This reveals
that both genders use violence only when they can afford to, and that that does not
necessarily signifY premeditation. '" In fact, Baron argues further that premeditation
and heat of passion are not necessarily mutually exclusive anyway. It is possible to
plan a killing in the grip ofdesperation and fear as well. 35 And thus, any time lapse
between the provocation and the resulting killing should not necessarily lead to an
inference that it was done with coldness and calculation.
Once these distinctions are recognised, it becomes easier ro empathise with the
delayed response of wo men to provocation through violence. This is because
violence is not socialized ro be the tool of the Woman, which is why she is not
quick to employ it.

GENDERED CONNOTATIONS OF THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE
The defence of provocation can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when
English law considered only certain instances as justifications of provocation:
insulting acts, beholding another being deprived of his liberty or 'seeing a man
in the act of adultery with ones wife.''" Central to all these instances is the notion
of the honour of the male. 37 The birth of the defence thus reveals a gendered bias
at three levels. Beyond the first level - acts of sexual independence by women

33
34
35
36

Supra no tel 9 at 349.
!d at 350.
ld. at346.
Supra note 1 at 254; B. Brown, Th( "Ordinary Man"in Provocation: Anglo-Saxon Attitudes
and "Unreasonabk N on-Englishmm" 13(1) THE
QUARTERLY 209 (1964).

37 Supra note 19 at 339.
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being immediately perceived as provocative - the defence amwers two further
questions to the exclusion of women: what justifies provocation, and for whom?
Provocation took root when invasions ro honour and property 'rightfully' invited the
wrath of men." English law initially operated under the notion that the woman was
the properry of the man, which made adultery not only an offence to honour, but
also thefi:.)' Throughout its 400-year jurisprudence, adultery is cited as the rypical
case of provocation,'· in the law's unequivocal sympathy with the 'rage,' 'jealousy'
and 'ownership' of men over the body and sexuality of the woman.
Thus, for whose defence was provocation manufactured? The body of the man
was not the property of the woman. Rage, jealottSJ and honour did not belong
ro the woman. It was only in 1946 that provocation was first available ro a
woman on finding her husband in adultery."
But, is the 1946 concession 'concession' enough? Or is it another instance of
'masculinising' the priorities of women? Taylor argues that it merely evaluates
female behaviour against the yardstick of male behaviour. Thus, this concession
has been granted not because women themselves perceive adultery to be sufficiently
provocative, but because the male experience defines it as such. Women are known
to rarely react to infidelity by husbands through violence," an arutude that reflects
their different social experiences, as argued previously. Efforts to make the defence
more inclusive of specific gender experiences should account fOJ the motivations
that women find provocative, such as fear and violence.')
In this way, the defence of provocation has been founded on firm 'masculine'
values. Even where women have been included, they have been included by
virtue of their 'masculine experiences.'
38 R v. Maddy (1672) 1 Vent 158; Supra 20 at 226; Suptal9 at 339.
39 Supra nOte 32 at 154.
40 ]. HOROER, PROVOCATION AND REsPONSIBILITY 24 (2003); supra no te 19 at 339 ; supra
note 1 at 254.
4 1 Supra note 29 at 227.

42 ld.
43 ld.
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However, the gender-exclusion of the defence extends far beyond its contextual
hisrory. Provocation continues ro be defined legally in a cripplingly biased
manner. This is because the success of the plea of provocation ro murder is
predicated on a cwo-step process. First, rhe defendant must prove actual loss of
self-control. Second, the defendant must prove that a reasonable person would
have lost self-control in the same way. If the foundations of the defence are not
exclusionary enough, the second leg of the defence certainly ensures complete
alienation of women - who is the 'reasonable person' after all?
The 'reasonable person' standard makes a shallow pretence at objectiviry. By
definition, it demands abidance ro the notions of behaviour expected by and
of the dominant sections. The experiences of all are related ro the experiences
of the entity that sets these norms. Deviations are punished harshly due
ro an absence of understanding of the 'Other.' In this way, the reasonable
person becomes an able-bodied, upper class, educated, White English man.
The reasonable person standard thus determines whether the reaction of
the defendant meets the approval of the reaction of a person with the above
characteristics. The standard is therefore inherently replete with class-, race-,
gender-based prejudices. Accordingly, it is easier ro sympathise with a woman
who kills due ro the husband's infidelity, because infidelity is a value that the
'reasonable person' finds offensive. At the same time, the law grapples with its
sympathy with a woman reeling under post-partum depression.··

Camplin sought ro overcome this detachment of the reasonable person standard
by permitting the age and sex of the defendant to be accounted for!' Indian law,
on the other hand, disaggregates only for the class of the person, and not her
sex! 6 However, this cusromization roo does not solve the problem. Now, it is
not only a question of how the 'reasonable person' will behave himself, but also
the behaviour the ' reasonable person' expects of the 'Other.' This norm-setting
tacitly tends towards essentialization and stereotyping. The case of R v. Doughty

44

J.

Oem, Po"partum Psychosis and the Insanisy Difense, 56
361 (1989).

REVIEW

45

Camplin, [1978J 2 All ER 168.

46

Supra note 6.
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is helpful in throwing light over such a practice." In this case, a man found
the constant wailing of his 17-day old son 'provocative,' as a result of which,
he caused the latter's death. The plea of provocation succeeded. A reasonable
woman, however, is staunchly maternal and compassionate as the care-taker of
the child. The same defence will, accordingly, either be denied to a mother, or
require special additional medical proof of post-partum depression '

8

Similarly, the law permits violent reactions to affronts to the 'chastity' of a
woman, believing that the sexual purity of a woman is as important to her as
the 'reasonable person' believes it to be. This belief is often misplaced, since
the chastity of the woman, similar to adultery, is often valued more by the men
associated with the woman than the woman herself;" again, due to the notion
that the woman's body is the site of the man's honour.
Naturally then, the inevitable pitfall of essentialization is repeated, when some
women do not fit the stereotype that is envisaged.
What is the symbolism of the reasonable person standard to 'real' women, in that
case? The reason behind the existence of the standard is to mould behaviour and
comment on the desirability of certain actions. There are two messages, then, that
this standard imparts. First, women are automatically disadvantaged because, in
the absence of an understanding of the 'Other,' the law perceives their behaviour
to be undesirable. Secondly, serving as the other side of the sa me coin, it places a
premium on the values and conduct of men, such that that becomes the 'human'
aspiration. This uniformization further pushes the voices of women to the fringe.
Mercifully, the law has evolved further to mitigate the degree of exclusion faced by
women. While the sex of the defendant was permitted to determine reasonableness
of reaction after Camp/in, common law struggled for a long time thereafter to
determine what othercharacreristics of the defendant to attribu te to the reasonable

47
48

49

(1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 319.
S H Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation 43 University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform 167 (2009).
Supra note 29 at 227
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person, and whether mental conditions and temperaments can be induded.,o This
dilemma presented itself at the first trial of Kiranj it Ahluwalia as well. The judge
permitted the jury to account for her sex, ethniciry and education. A reference
to her mental condition, affected by her experience as a battered woman, was
excluded. At the retrial, this characteristic was considered relevant as a factor that
affects the self-control of the woman as a consequence of their specific background.
This was subsequently ratified in the cases of R v. Thornton" and Humphreys,52
after which the doors to the BWS were opened in common law.

IMPACT ON THE AGENCY OF WOMEN OF BWS
The previous three sections explored the traditional inaccessibiliry to the defence
of provocation by women due to its male-biased definition. However, there are
two ways in which women have been sought to be included in the fold . The first
pertains to the recognition of the sex of the defendant in the reasonable person
test. However, this does not redefine the values underlying the defence, but merely
concedes an attitudinal difference in limited circumstances. The second attempt
seeks to directly address the differing social and cultural experiences of women
through an acknowledgement of the BWS. This accepts that provocation may be
driven by fear, as opposed to only anger. It also concedes that a delayed response
to the provocation does not necessarily indicate premeditation, but may in fact
continue to be influenced by a loss of self-control.
But, this recognition exists as a mere exception to the general conceptualization of
the defence, which is still moulded around the male experience. The provocative
act must still induce anger; the defendant must still respond spontaneously.
The law permits otherwise only as a deviation. The female experience continues
to be an aberration, and not the ordinary. To admit this 'deviant' behaviour,
jurisdictions in which the BWS is recognised require special expert evidence,
and it is not accounted for as a matter of course.
50

R v. Smith [2001 J 1 AC 146; R v. Weller [2004J 1 Cr. App. R. 1; Humphreys [1995J 4
All ER 1008; Dryden [1995J 4 All ER 987; R v. Newell (I 980) 71 c, App. R 331.
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R v. Thornto n, Supra 4.

52

Humphreys, supra
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Contrast this with the approach of the Gauhati High Court in ManjuLakra.
Here, the Court invoked the Protection ofWomen from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 , and S.498-A of the Indian Penal Code to establish thaI , if the conduct of
the husband qualified as domestic violence and cruelty under these legislations,
the wife would qualifY as a 'battered woman,' regardless of a mental affiiction."
Presumably, this is owed to the infancy of the BWS debate in India. Nevertheless,
as I argue now, this approach is preferable to the reliance on expert evidence, but
is still not ideal, for it too exceptionalizes the experiences of women.
What are the implications of this 'excepting' the experience of women? One,
the law continues to view women differently. Two, it attributes the difference
not ro the woman, but to a deformity in the woman. Third, it requires an
' interlocutor' to understand the 'difference.' This section analyses how the
perception of the woman in criminal law as a perennial 'victim' to the 'hands
of fate' is further compounded with the special reliance on a medical affiiction
to justifY her actions, when such a reliance is presumably the only means of
including her experiences in the discourse.
Discourses on the criminality of women have attributed their actions either to
their biology or to their pathology. One theory posirs that women are inherently
incapable of committing crimes. This is attributed to their biological 'state of
development.''' Since they are less advanced than men, women are naturally
passive and disinclined towards aggressive or criminal conduct. This theory,
therefore, also lays the foundations for perceiving women cri inals as 'deviants,'
since they do not conform to their biological pattern. In this case, the reason
why women do not commit crimes is because of biology. If they do, it is because
of pathology. Women criminals are 'wired' differently. A normal woman is not
a criminal, which is why all women that are criminals are 'abnormal.'
Other srudies on fe male criminology characterise hormonal imbalance ofwomen
to be determinative of their actions. Pollack, for instance, put all his figurative
53

Supra nore 10.

54

J.

BRIDGEMAN AND

S.

MILLNS , FEM INIST PERSPECTIVES ON

WITH THE FEMALE BODY

609 (1998).
108

LAw: LAw's EN GAGEMENT

Provocation of the Battered Woman: Normalization of the Woman's
Experience through a Syndrome

eggs in the basket of the 'generative' phases' of women, I.e., menstruation,
pregnancy and menopause. He argued that since these phases are accompanied
by 'psychological disturbances' in the woman's psychology and physiology, the
woman becomes prone ro committing crimes under their effects, 55 This theory
continues to be one of the dominant discourses in criminology today. It represents
the woman as a helpless puppet to her hormones, devoid of any agency or free
will of her own. Thus, it is not the woman who acts, but her hormones .
In both these cases, the woman does not participate in crime due to herself,
but because of deftcts in her body, some of which are inherent. For the woman,
the mind does not control the body, the body controls the mind. The pitfall
of such biological essentialization is that it precludes the understanding of any
violence by a woman as narural, which is why it alienates sympathy for their
stories. It is not true that women do not, and cannot, use violence at all. They
resort to it less frequently and fot different reasons than men.
The BWS, unfurtunately, conforms more to this kind of biological essentialization.
A man, as an agent of himself, needs only an 'act provocative,' in his own
imagination, to kill. For a woman, on the other hand, an 'act provocative' in
her imagination is insufficient for her to act with violence. She further requires
a psychological syndrome which drives her hands to deliver a fotal stroke to her
batterer. The law, even now, finds it difficult to accept that women may act
'criminally' oftheir own, without attributing it to their biology or pathology. It fails
to recognise that even if women are slow to employ violence, it does not detract
from the fact that when they do, they do so as a normal response to their situation.
The BWS reinforces the perception that a woman does not kill, because she is not
made that way. She kills only due to some deficiency in her mental capabilities.
In this way, it is not the woman who acts, but the syndrome. 'Normal' women
still do not kill; only abnormal women do, because their experience of battering
is a sickness. Thus, even though the law attempts to include the voices of women
into the fold, it does so by characterising those voices as an abnormality.
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The problem with essentialization arises, however, when it displays tangible
repercussions. Since BWS is a syndrome, like all medical co ditions, it too has
fixed 'symptoms.' Just like a patient of chickenpox sprouts boils allover the body,
a 'patient' of the BWS is helpless, does not fight back and is weak-willed - an
image that Dr. Walker constructed, which Gondolf and Fisher have critiqued
quite successfully. Therefore, how does the law respond when it encounters a
woman with the same history of violence who resists? It d es not understand
her. To avail of mitigation via the BWS, she must prove that the symptoms
accurately describe her, just as they accurately described Kiranjit Ahluwalia. If
not, then she does not 'suffer' from the BWS. A person who does not suffer
from BWS does not respond to fear with violence. Therefore, she is a 'deviant'
because she is a woman criminal, and women do not kill. Sbe attracts a 'double
punishment'56 for not only her criminal act, but also for deviating from the
norm set for her. The law yet again rewards a submissive and helpless wife. 57
This failing was evident in Aris, where the defendant shot her sleeping husband
five times in the head after an episode of beating in whid l he threatened to
wake and kill her. 58 The Court rejected evidence of the BWS on the grounds
that the defendant did not fit the profile of a battered woman - she was not
passive and she was not fragile . The same repeated in Wilson, when the strategy
of the prosecution was to merely argue that the defendant did not exhibit any
of the characteristics of a battered woman. 59
What are the consequences of seeking to explain the resp nse of the woman
through a medical afRiction when, in equal circumstances, the response of the
man would have been self-explanatory? The woman requires proof through expert
evidence of her 'condition.'60 The landmark case of R v. Lavalleev indicated the
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voices of numerous victims of BWS by holding expert psychological testimony
on the BWS admissible to explain the reasonableness of the reaction of the
defendant 61 The COUrt held that such evidence serves multiple crucial ends by
'dispelling myths' about battered women, such as that they are 'masochistic,'
which is why they sustain an abusive relationship. It could further explain the
belief of the defendant of the 'imminence' of violence, since she knows the cycle of
battering best 6 ' However, in attempting to depict the reaction of the defendant as
reasonable, the BWS tends to be counterproductive. The reason why the woman
does not leave the relationship is because of her psychological condition, reeking
of irrationality, and not due to financial and other limitations.
Further, the reliance on expert evidence demonstrates another manner in which
the agency of the woman is derided. This symbolises that the experiences and
stories of women are an 'aberration,' which is why it requires a person with
expert knowledge to comment on it. Most importantly, the fact that the law
demands an intermediary to explain the situation of the women precludes the
women themselves from narrating their stories. Their image as passive entities
who need an external agent to speak for them is reinforced, and inclusion goes
for a toss. The voices of women are further distanced from the mainstream.
As such, the BWS has the pitfall of continuously casting the woman as an
irrational, passive being, as the 'Other.' They are excluded from narrating their
own stories. Women as the determinants of their own actions are dispelled. Her
circumstances are not perceived as 'normal,' and nor is her siruation. Abidance
by the systems mandates en masse homogenisation of the behaviour of battered
women to measure up to the stereotype. For all these reasons, the defence of the
BWS is often called a 'Faustian Bargain,' wherein the BWS is the sole means
of the woman to gain recognition in the system, even though it comes at the
cost of her agency and subjectivity."
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CONCLUSION
The difference between a helpless victim and the survivor lies in the ownership
of her voice, her tale, her experience. Through this dimensIOn, the BWS takes
away from one hand what it gives through the other. This paper analysed the
manner in which R v. Ahluwalia, while including the lived experiences of
women into law, pathologizes them .
The BWS does not challenge the foundations of provocation, and the manner
in which ir legitimizes only masculine forms of violence - that is, violence that
is perpetrated immediately, in rage, in defence of honour, and in the exercise
of power. A feminization of the defence would require recognition of the
relationship that women have with violence - violence that is perpetrated slowly,
fearfully, and in a bid to empowerment.
Instead, the BWS projects women as 'exceptions,' pitiful, irrational slaves to their
pathology, incapable of narrating their own stories . It does nOt view battered
women as agents with lived experiences, actively seeking an escape from their
situations, and living ro tell their tale. This view, problemat:ically, also rewards
stereotypes of helpless victims devoid of agency - a pitfall Gondolf and Fisher
strive to overcome.

To recognise the full personhood of women as ' individuals' under the law, it
is necessary to re-mould the provocation defence entirely. The law does not
require an expert psychological determination of whether a man actually lost
self-control or not. Therefore, the testimony of the woman should be sufficient
in itself to establish loss of self-control in response to sustained battering,
instead of requiring additional proof of a medical conditinn. To this limited
extent, the approach in Manjulakra is preferable to that in other commonwealth
jurisdictions. The law should recognise that violence for self-preservation is not
pathological or irrational. It is entirely rational and instinctive. Only in this
way will the law remove the distance it places between women and itself and
speak to her experiences directly.
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